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In the democratizing societies of Europe and Latin America, politi 
cal officials of many subnational jurisdictions are likely to be elected 
on platforms of promoting economic development. As they formulate 
their policies, many such officials will predictably face similar institu 
tional and substantive constraints: few conventional economic policy 
instruments under their control; administrators inexperienced in man 
aging government agencies in a democratic context; few business own 
ers or managers with an adequate conception of how their industries 
can create and capture value in highly integrated market-oriented econ 
omies; innovation or entrepreneurship in business activity unlikely to 
be a cultural tradition; and government intervention through "plan 
ning" discredited in the public mind.
The search for effective combinations of policies, agency mandates, 
organizational strategies, and operational methods in such settings 
might be significantly aided by examining how the challenge of pro 
moting economic development was handled in one of Spain's poorest 
regions—Andalusia—after the nation consolidated its transition to 
democracy. The goal of improving the economic well-being of this 
region was codified in the Statute of Autonomy, which became law in 
1981. 1 The same commitment was embodied in the electoral program 
of the party winning an absolute majority in the 1982 regional parlia 
mentary elections. Once in power, the region's first political executives 
faced the institutional and substantive constraints listed above.
After a policymaking process described as an act of democratic 
planning, top regional officials announced a policy of achieving devel- 
opment-from-within. 2 Concurrently, the regional parliament created 
the Institute of Industrial Promotion of Andalusia (IPIA), whose man-
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date was to promote small and medium-sized locally owned industrial 
enterprises.3 IPIA's organizational strategy sought to involve the stake 
holders of a handful of industries in formulating and implementing a 
common competitive strategy4 and to persuade public and private 
financial institutions to extend credit and subsidies to participating 
firms.5 IPIA's operational method was to instigate an interactive plan 
ning process that focused stakeholders' attention on the need to 
improve natural resource utilization, product quality, marketing strat 
egy, infrastructure, plant and equipment, access to financing, procure 
ment, working conditions, and training. In addition, the planning 
process intended to identify a large number of actions that would per 
mit the region's firms to create and capture more value as a result of 
their work.6 This process entailed negotiating what was termed a com 
prehensive and dynamic action plan.7
IPIA's most successful action plan—given the policy of develop- 
ment-from-within and the agency's mission and strategy—involved 
Andalusia's white marble mining and fabrication industry, which is 
clustered around the mountain communities of Macael (pronounced 
Mahk-eye-el) County in Almerfa province. During the first phase of the 
Macael Action Plan (1983-87), the industry's sales revenues expanded 
fivefold. The Macael firms' new ability to compete in the growing mar 
ket for quality finished marble construction materials accounts for the 
prodigious growth in revenues. Analysis of this case shows that IPIA's 
operational method—championing the formulation and implementa 
tion of a negotiated, comprehensive, and dynamic action plan— 
enabled Macael firms to compete in the marble construction materials 
industry.
The skills needed to employ IPIA's operational method success 
fully—in Andalusia as elsewhere—include leadership, negotiation, 
and political management. Skilled leaders can mobilize people to face 
their problems, search for solutions, make informed decisions, and 
accept change. Skilled negotiators can forge networks of value-creat 
ing agreements, often involving significant degrees of cooperation 
among people and institutions. Skilled political managers can influence 
the policy and operational decisions of people and institutions without 
the aid of formal authority.
Arguably, officials responsible for agencies such as IPIA can only 
develop the skills of leadership, negotiation, and political management
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through practice and coaching. It is conceivable, however, that a prior 
skillful performance in one setting may leave a residue of clinical 
knowledge, which, if identified and utilized, would improve the skill 
displayed by officials subsequently using the same operational method 
in other settings. In an effort to begin cumulating clinical knowledge 
relevant for operating in policy contexts bearing a family resemblance 
to Andalusia in the mid-1980s, this paper offers a series of narrative 
accounts and interpretations of how the successful Macael Action Plan 
gradually unfolded.
Initial Conditions
When the Macael Action Plan was initiated in 1983, some 150 fam 
ily-owned firms employing an average of seven workers were engaged 
in marble mining and/or fabrication. Business owners followed the 
production and marketing practices of their forebears, resulting in tech 
nological backwardness. Dynamite, rather than precision saws, was the 
principal means by which marble was loosened from hillsides. Few 
fabricating shops were equipped with mechanical cutting and polishing 
devices. Even fewer firms were able to establish brand name recogni 
tion and none had the capacity to fill a major construction order. As a 
result, 70 percent of extracted marble was sold to manufacturers in 
other regions in Spain, who produced quality goods for the huge 
national construction industry, while Macael fabricators limited their 
production to a narrow line of artisanal goods. This pattern of eco 
nomic activity had characterized the marble industry in Macael for 
decades, resulting in static revenues and ingrained resistance to 
change. Overcoming such impediments would have required some 
degree of collaboration among firms. However, for Macael's individu 
alistic business owners, collaboration was anathema.
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The Joining-Up Process
Events at Macael
IPIA's first contact with Macael business owners took place in their 
own quarries and fabricating shops. Accompanied by the local mayor, 
IPIA's director general spent two days touring these sites before the 
idea of holding a meeting was broached with business owners. The 
director used this opportunity to learn about the industry's work and. 
Macael's deteriorating economy. Through his presence, manner, and 
line of questioning, IPIA's director also sought to demonstrate his gen 
uine concern for the industry and to spark curiosity about why IPIA 
had come to Macael.
By then, it had become common knowledge that a man from IPIA 
was in town. When the mayor called an impromptu meeting of the 
employers association and trade unions, their leaders came. The direc 
tor, Ricardo Sa"nchez de la Morena, explained that IPIA's aim was to 
build on the strengths of Andalusia's land and people to promote entre- 
preneurship in the region. He noted that those he had spoken with dur 
ing the previous two days felt the local marble industry was in crisis 
and that a solution was not evident. He did not offer a diagnosis, 
though he mentioned that deficiencies in infrastructure and equipment 
were clear. He invited the people in attendance to work with IPIA in 
developing an action plan to "totally modernize" the local industry.
The Macael Action Plan, the director explained, would be unlike 
most development plans. It would deal with all issues concerning the 
marble industry, including technology, products, finance, infrastruc 
ture, and working conditions; it would be dynamic, beginning with a 
diagnosis of the problems and opportunities of the local marble indus 
try; and it would focus on changing the reality of the industry. The 
Macael Action Plan would not be formulated by IPIA, but rather would 
be negotiated by the assembled group, with IPIA serving as general 
coordinator. Sa*nchez de la Morena also promised that IPIA would use 
its influence to mobilize resources from banks, utilities, and govern 
ment agencies—so long as the group agreed unanimously on every ele 
ment of the Action Plan.
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Knowing that the audience's aspirations for economic betterment 
were checked by anxieties about participating in such a group process, 
IPIA's director wanted to build immediate commitment to an action 
plan. He gave them a stark choice: either agree unanimously at that 
moment to work with IPIA on a comprehensive, negotiated, and 
dynamic action plan, or forfeit the chance to enlist his support for mod 
ernizing the Macael marble industry.8 After some discussion, a vote 
was taken. It demonstrated that the balance of sentiments had tipped 
uniformly in favor of initiating the process.
Clinical Interpretations
The initial meeting must include the active participation of the 
industry's professional associations. No one would be in a better insti 
tutional position to speak on behalf of business owners than top offi 
cials of the employers association. The participation of local 
governmental officials and union leaders may also be essential for sub 
stantive and political reasons.
How the regional government frames the problem and describes an 
action plan is of paramount importance. While it is valuable to leave 
open the question of substance to the industry's own sense of its situa 
tion and potential, it is equally important to emphasize the defining 
characteristics of an action plan: that it is negotiated, comprehensive, 
and dynamic, and that all decisions must be unanimous. These features 
ensure that each component of the local industry will be a full partner 
in the action plan and that the interests and concerns of all participants 
will be addressed during the planning process.
Whether IPIA's brinkmanship during the first meeting at Macael 
was generally appropriate can be debated. The chief merit of this 
approach is that it frames as sharply as possible the question of 
whether to continue sliding into crisis or to work together towards a 
common solution, drawing to some degree on outside help. Putting the 
issue to an immediate vote serves other purposes as well. It forces the 
attendees to make a public commitment to the agency and to each 
other. If the vote is positive, some of the anxieties about the process 
will likely be suppressed. Imposing the unanimity rule also serves to 
embed this important process norm in the group's experience from the 
start.
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Negotiating the Action Plan
Events at Macael
In advance of the first official meeting of the planning committee, 
which took place in September 1983, IPIA wrote and distributed a 
draft document that enumerated what it regarded as the key issues and 
problems of the local marble industry. Hie broad categories of issues 
were production, commercialization, and personnel. IPIA's director 
general began the meeting by presenting the draft outline. As the dis 
cussion developed, it became apparent that opinions differed sharply 
on factual premises as well as on what should be done. Before closing 
the session, IPIA urged the committee to adopt a work plan for prepar 
ing its next meeting. The employers association said it would survey 
the industry to count the number of firms and workers belonging to 
each branch of activity and to gauge each firm's level of technological 
development. In addition, subcommittees on production, commercial 
ization, and personnel were formed. These groups were charged with 
the task of drafting preliminary reports about their respective areas of 
interest, to be presented to the full committee at its October meeting. 
Each report was to identify problems, proposed solutions, and suggest 
who would be responsible for followup.
The director came away from the meeting convinced that IPIA 
needed to be in constant, if informal, contact with the subcommittees 
during this critical phase in the process. Since travel time between 
Macael and the Institute's headquarters in Sevilla exceeded eight 
hours, he could not play this role himself. Sa*nchez de la Morena there 
fore asked a consultant in whom he had complete confidence to spend 
the following weeks or months in Macael.
While the work plan did not allow time for formal studies to be 
done, the subcommittees did have access to advice from knowledge 
able individuals. As an example, the production subcommittee inter 
viewed on several occasions the chief of the mining section of the 
central government's provincial delegation. The expert, Rafael 
Escribano, shared with the committee the limited information that was 
known about Macael's white marble deposits and suggested a number 
of specific studies that he believed would be valuable.
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The full committee debated the draft reports during two days of 
meetings in October. While many disagreements persisted, they were 
muted by three factors: some disputes about facts were resolved by 
investigation or expert opinion, committee members had experienced 
working together, and every participant felt ownership of at least one 
subcommittee's draft report. By the end of the second day, IPIA's 
director believed that agreement on the issues was sufficient to support 
the fonnalization of an action plan. He promised that IPIA would use 
the subcommittee reports in preparing a full draft of the plan, which 
would serve as the basis for discussion at the meeting scheduled for 
November.
Apart from summarizing the problems, the draft identified a number 
of lines of action, including revising contractual mining rights, com 
missioning geological and engineering studies of the area's marble 
deposits, establishing an office for technological support, contracting 
with designers for assistance in gauging the artisanal goods market, 
setting standards for product quality, improving roads, expanding elec 
trical networks, planning industrial sites, creating a purchasing cooper 
ative, conducting market research, founding a marketing cooperative, 
improving occupational health and safety, sponsoring educational pro 
grams, and seeking official financing. Each line of action identified the 
problem it addressed, conceptualized distinct phases, set a time frame 
for each phase, and assigned responsibility for implementation to spe 
cific subcommittees. A slightly modified version of IPIA's proposal 
was unanimously adopted by the full committee in November 1983 
and became the official "Comprehensive Action Plan of the Area of 
Marble of Macael."
Clinical Interpretations
When the planning process begins, knowledge about the environ 
ment mostly reflects each committee member's respective experience. 
Intense conflict is to be expected when people whose perceptions of 
reality are untested interact for the first time.
Conflict can be productive if it motivates committee members to 
inquire into questions that they had considered settled. In striving 
towards this ideal, the action plan coordinator must be willing to play a 
leadership role in the planning committee. This role entails taking
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responsibility for structuring the initial discussions, as well as ensuring 
that diverse viewpoints are heard. Offering a roster of key issues is one 
way to focus attention. In managing the ensuing discussion, the 
regional promotion agency should not suppress differences of opinion, 
but rather should seek to help stakeholders to work through their dis 
agreements.
Subcommittees can bear much of the burden of detailing definitions 
of problematic issues, proposing lines of action, and fostering the par 
ticipants' sense of ownership of the planning process. An action plan 
coordinator can influence the pace of the subcommittees' work by ask 
ing them to report by a certain date to the full group. The coordinator 
also can influence the substance of this work through ongoing informal 
contacts, which may require establishing a personal presence in the 
community during this phase of the process.
The realities of the planning process suggest it is incumbent on the 
coordinator to press for unanimous agreement on the action plan 
before the industry's problems are systematically studied. It might be 
thought that this approach is tantamount to putting the cart before the 
horse. However, the coordinator has to be concerned with building a 
cohesive planning committee, with creating a sense of momentum and 
accomplishment, with expressing respect for what the industry 
believed was true, and with projecting a unified image to agencies that 
would be asked to fund the studies recommended by the committee. 
Negotiating the first official version of the action plan before the 
research phase can place an industry in a better position both to obtain 
resources for high quality studies and to make effective use of what 
can be learned from expert inquiry. An additional advantage of this 
seemingly "inverted sequence" is that it embeds deeply into the fabric 
of the planning group's experience the norm that an action plan is 
negotiated and dynamic. 9
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Envisioning the Future
Events at Macael
IPIA's first major task in implementing the Action Plan was to 
arrange for studies of the area's geological structure and mining prac 
tices. Preliminary contacts with a state-owned research enterprise, 
ADARO, indicated that the proposed studies would cost more than 100 
million pesetas (roughly, $US 700,000) to complete. Under the 
national mining promotion law, the Ministry of Industry's General 
Direction for Mines could fund three-quarters of such costs. Since nei 
ther IPIA nor Macael could afford to make up the difference, Sa*nchez 
de la Morena decided to ask the Ministry to fund the full project. He 
invited Macael's mayor and the president of the employers association 
to accompany him at a meeting with Ministry of Industry officials in 
Madrid. In making their case, the trio claimed that Macael was fully 
committed to finding common solutions to its current crisis, as evi 
denced by its ability to reach unanimous agreement on its comprehen 
sive Action Plan. Studies of Macael's geological structure and mining 
practices were, they argued, crucial to the further development and 
success of the Action Plan. In the end, the Ministry agreed to fund 100 
percent of the ADARO studies.
Thanks to the active role played in formulating the plan by Rafael 
Escribano, the provincial mining official, participants on the planning 
committee knew from the outset what information they wanted to 
obtain through the geological and mining studies. They were looking 
for an authoritative measure of the magnitude of Macael's marble 
deposits. They wanted to know how the quality of the area's marble 
compared with that of other regions in Spain and with that of Carrara, 
Italy's premier white marble-producing area. They hoped to learn how 
to reduce the debris generated in huge quantities by the technique of 
blasting marble blocks and boulders out of quarry frontages. They 
sought ways to prevent landslides in the mines. In addition, they were 
curious about how the spatial distribution of the area's various marble 
formations related to the boundaries of their respective quarries. Some 
committee members were also interested to know how this information 
might be used in planning the industry's development.
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Since much of ADARO's work took place in the field, many busi 
ness owners came into direct contact with the activities of the Action 
Plan. Some business owners gained additional familiarity with the geo 
logical and mining research studies by attending periodic meetings, 
called by the employers association, at which interim results were dis 
cussed. At one event, for instance, Rafael Escribano and ADARO 
researchers explained the significance of detailed aerial photographs 
that had been taken of Macael's surroundings. At a subsequent meet 
ing, it was announced that Macael possessed Spain's largest endow 
ment of white marble, which ADARO said would likely remain 
plentiful for at least a few generations, and that Macael's marble was 
more durable than Carrara's.
With the aid of science, IPIA was able to draw out the competitive 
implications of these facts about nature: If Macael's white marble was 
the most plentiful in Spain and more durable than Carrara's, then the 
area should strive to become a formidable competitor in the national 
and European marble industry. As to why Macael was suffering an eco 
nomic crisis, despite its potential competitive advantages, scientific 
studies provided an alternative answer to a lack of subsidies: the 
boundaries of the existing quarries did not correspond to rock forma 
tions and the use of dynamite reduced the yield of valuable marble 
blocks. This analysis implied that Macael needed to seek solutions to 
its problems, such as restructuring property rights and introducing 
major technological change, that were not part of the industry's usual 
way of looking at itself. These conclusions did ring true for a sizable 
number of Macael business owners, as indicated by their eventual 
enthusiasm for both kinds of changes.
Sensing that business owners were emboldened by the news that 
Macael was richly endowed with marble of the highest quality, yet 
anxious about the recommendation that mining rights be restructured 
and technology updated, IPIA created an opportunity for members of 
the employers association, along with a few other planning committee 
participants, to travel to Carrara. IPIA and the employers association 
agreed to share the projected travel expenses of 3 million pesetas ($US 
25,000). The trip to Italy by bus was an important experience for those 
who went along, most of whom had yet to travel beyond Spain. In Car 
rara, they toured quarries, fabricating shops, and residential areas, find 
ing little resemblance between the world of Macael and the one they
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were coming to know. In many quarries, for example, they saw fully 
automated machines, equipped with industrial diamonds, cut huge 
blocks out of marble veins. In the fabricating shops, they observed the 
operation of automatic saws mat sliced marble blocks into thin sheets, 
which were then mechanically polished into finished floor tiles and 
steps. During the stay, the visitors from Macael also had a chance to 
meet with their local counterparts and representatives of Italian equip 
ment manufacturers. Some members of the delegation came away from 
this experience saying to themselves, "We are nobodies in this busi 
ness." The term "total modernization," which had been bandied about 
by IPIA even since S£nchez de la Morena first proposed the idea of 
working on an action plan for Macael, suddenly had a fuller meaning.
Clinical Interpretations
An important task at this stage in the process is to draw out the com 
petitive implications of objective knowledge about the physical and 
economic environment of the industry. Once business owners become 
accustomed to thinking that the operating environment can be under 
stood with some degree of objectivity and that the local industry is a 
valid unit of analysis, action plan coordinators should help work out a 
detailed, shared vision that expresses what the industry as a whole 
wants to achieve. A vision is not so much a statement of objectives as a 
shared cognitive and affecting image of a state of affairs that individu 
als sense is worth striving toward. Shared visions motivate individual 
and collective action and foster agreement on what operational steps 
should be taken.
When most people reflect upon what they want to achieve, they look 
for role models. It is reasonable to infer by analogy that a traditional 
industry's effort to envision an attractive future will be aided if its 
stakeholders are familiar with traditional industries which overcame 
the competitive disadvantages of fragmentation. Bringing action plan 
participants into contact with potential role models could well be the 
most cost-effective investment a coordinator can make.
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Building Institutions and Planning Investments
Events at Macael
During 1984, while the ADARO studies were in progress, members 
of the planning committee began to explore ways to solve certain prob 
lems common to all firms in the area. Almost everyone felt, for exam 
ple, that the dirt roads leading into the quarries were a problem. They 
were dusty in summer, muddy in winter, and generally unsafe for the 
large trucks that drove along them hauling away marble stones and 
boulders. The narrow, winding paved roads that connected the several 
municipalities of the Macael area to one another and to the major pro 
vincial roads were also considered inadequate. Knowing that the 
regional government, which was responsible for roads, was short on 
funds, the employers association proposed that its members and the 
government share the costs: if the regional government would pay for 
the asphalt, the firms would supply the labor to lay it on the roadbed. 
After some delay, the initiative succeeded. This event set the stage for 
a more comprehensive agreement in mid-1985 for road improvements, 
signed by Macael and two departments of the regional government. 10
A second major problem upon which all could agree was the need to 
improve the availability of electricity in the industrial and mining 
areas. Solving this problem required the cooperation of the privately 
owned electric power utility of Andalusia, the Compaflfa Sevillana de 
Electricidad. IPIA took the lead in pressuring the utility to invest in 
Macael. As a result, the company invested about 74 million pesetas 
($US 500,000) in the area in 1984, up from 13 million pesetas the pre 
vious year. 11
The Macael Action Plan called for studying the feasibility of creat 
ing several industrywide institutions, which were strongly favored by 
IPIA and the local government. One of these proposed institutions was 
a purchasing cooperative, which would take title to inputs it acquired 
in bulk and stored in its own warehouse until they were repurchased by 
Macael firms. The proposal did not spark much resistance since inter- 
firm rivalry focused on sales, and business owners recognized that they 
could purchase supplies at lower prices by concentrating their buying 
power. Moreover, a similar arrangement among extraction firms for the
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production and delivery of compressed air—a key blasting input—was 
already in place. Once the industry agreed in November 1984 to create 
the purchasing cooperative, plans were made for constructing the 
warehouse and a former local priest was hired to manage the operation.
The issue that generated the most conflict was the proposed joint 
sales and marketing cooperative. Both Macael's mayor and IPIA 
expected this institution to solve such key problems as small firms' 
inability to fill the large orders of major construction firms, field a sales 
organization, and fund promotional campaigns. They also hoped that it 
would mitigate tendencies of local firms to compete with each other for 
sales principally on the basis of price. Business owners, however, 
viewed this proposal as a threat to their individual autonomy. The firms 
whose commercial connections were better developed, furthermore, 
did not see how they would be advantaged by the marketing coopera 
tive. Despite stiff resistance from the employers association, both IPIA 
and the mayor pressed ahead with the feasibility study called for by the 
Action Plan. The opposition of the employers association relented in 
mid-1985, when agreement on a relatively weak marketing cooperative 
was hammered out. 12
In early 1985, IPIA shifted attention to the idea of creating a corpo 
ration whose principal asset would initially be the brand name, "Mar 
ble of Macael." This corporation, at a minimum, would prepare audio 
visual materials on the industry's products, represent the industry at 
trade fairs, and promote the name of Marble of Macael in the media. A 
more ambitious conception was to give the corporation the power to 
prohibit local firms from using the brand name if they failed to meet 
specific quality standards. This latter suggestion, however, foundered 
on business owners' unwillingness to have the quality of their products 
judged by such an organization. IPIA and the mayor believed it was 
more important to launch the brand name corporation, the "Sociedad 
de la Marca 'M£rmol de Macael,' S.A.," than to hold out for more 
restrictive bylaws. The two camps reached an agreement in November 
1985. 13
A second major objective of the Action Plan in 1985—in addition to 
building institutions—was to translate the general vision of Macael's 
modernization into a plan for investing in plant and equipment. Such a 
plan was to be used in attracting financing from official and private 
institutions and in inducing changes in the operations of individual
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firms. Formulating the industrial restructuring model required detailed 
knowledge of firms' existing product lines, scale, output quality, access 
to raw materials, plant, equipment, production management, sales 
capacity, administrative skill, and the like. This information was col 
lected by a consulting firm hired by IPIA and the employers associa 
tion. The interim product of this effort was a classification of Macael 
firms by product line, based on their existing capacities and what their 
future role in the industry might be.
This formulation of the industrywide plan for firm-level investments 
generated some controversy at meetings of business owners convened 
by the employers association. The consulting firm modified the pro 
posed model somewhat before recommending investments for each 
category of firms.
In November 1985, the planning committee made the industrial 
restructuring model and its investment plan part of the official Macael 
Action Plan. 14 Shortly thereafter, IPIA announced that it would cover 9 
percent of the investment costs of the larger firms and 18 percent of 
those of smaller firms, so long as these firms' proposed projects were 
consistent with the industrial restructuring model.
By the beginning of 1986, about two years into the implementation 
of the Action Plan, Macael was thus well positioned to respond to the 
rising domestic demand for marble construction materials. Some infra- 
structural improvements were complete and many more were planned, 
including the development of industrial sites equipped with electrical 
lines, telephone circuits, and water supplies. Business owners were 
beginning to collaborate with one another, as long as their autonomy 
was not genuinely threatened. As a symbol of this new willingness to 
cooperate, a centrally located building containing the offices of the 
employers association and the warehouse of the buyers cooperative 
was about to be inaugurated. The Sociedad de la Marca was gearing up 
to promote the brand name, Mdrmol de Macael. Many business owners 
were primed to invest in new plant and equipment; a few had already 
begun to do so by reinvesting whatever profits they had been earning. 
The idea of a comprehensive and negotiated action plan for the mod 
ernization of Macael's marble industry, furthermore, had been given a 
detailed, logical expression in the industrial restructuring model. But 
IPIA and the industry knew that even the best laid plans for Macael 
could founder on the absence of external financial support.
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Clinical Interpretations
An action plan should eventually offer a clear conception of how the 
industry as a whole intends to compete in the national and international 
marketplace. It should also embody specific plans for designing, pro 
ducing, and selling products. And it should offer a framework for plan 
ning and evaluating the array of firm-level and collective investments 
that would make it possible to carry out the strategic business plan.
At the time a shared vision begins to form, such a detailed plan can 
only be a distant objective. In deciding what issues to take up, in what 
order, and with what duration of inquiry, an action plan coordinator, 
therefore, should also seek to achieve some interim process objectives. 
One such objective is to sustain industry leaders' newly generated opti 
mism about the prospects for meaningful change and to help their 
respective constituencies share this attitude.
An action plan committee may create a sense of momentum by ini 
tially working on issues that tend to generate modest conflict (e.g., 
road paving and the purchasing cooperative in Macael). When commit 
ment to the action plan concept is strong and a specific vision is begin 
ning to form, the planning process can handle intense conflict (such as 
that generated by the marketing and sales cooperative issue).
In managing intensely conflictual issues, an action plan coordinator 
might best take a long-term view of its goals. The critical short-term 
interest includes educating business owners about the prospects of 
their industry and demonstrating to the outside world that the industry 
is overcoming the effects of fragmentation. In the short run, it may be 
less important to enforce common standards of quality, for instance, 
than to enlarge business owners' experience with collaborative institu 
tions.
Handling controversial issues sequentially is useful in containing 
conflict, building decisionmaking capacity, and distributing the plan 
ning committee's workload over time. Yet, dealing simultaneously 
with a range of issues, such as infrastructure, plant and equipment, and 
collaborative institutions is necessary for planning to result in a com 
petitive strategy before too long.
In advancing simultaneously along these lines without overtaxing 
the planning committee, it is almost certainly necessary to use the ser 
vices of consulting firms. Action plan coordinators can reduce the risks
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of involving consultants by educating them about the premises and 
precepts of the process. In addition, it is advisable to arrange for at 
least one of the other planning committee members to share the costs 
of the consulting work. This arrangement strengthens the norm that the 
planning committee is responsible for making the decisions that shape 
the local industry's future. It also facilitates the interactive relationship 




IPIA's early fund-raising efforts on behalf of the Macael Action Plan 
met with considerable success. As discussed above, the Ministry of 
Industry agreed to cover the entire cost of ADARO's scientific and 
engineering studies. The Compaflfa Sevillana de Electricidad and 
Telef6nica were persuaded to greatly increase their rate of investment 
in Macael. The regional government, as well, invested $3.5 million 
during 1984-85 in roads, market research, warehousing facilities for 
the buyers and marketing cooperatives, office space for the employers 
association, and a medical clinic for Macael's workers.
Despite these early successes in channeling funds towards research 
and infrastructure projects, IPIA was extremely anxious about deliver 
ing on its commitment to help firms finance investments in plant and 
equipment. The pressures on the Institute to fulfill business owners' 
expectations became especially acute in late 1985, when the planning 
committee approved the industrial restructuring model. 15 This detailed 
plan called for investments of more than 3 billion pesetas ($US 25 mil 
lion) in Macael's fabricating shops (i.e., seven times the amount gener 
ated by the Action Plan so far).
IPIA's anxiety about delivering on its promise to mobilize resources 
was further heightened by several facts. IPIA knew that most Macael 
firms had never obtained subsidies from the central government 
Andalusia's regional government, moreover, remained short on funds 
while the fiscal system for Spain's 17 Autonomous Communities
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evolved. And Macael firms could not yet finance a high proportion of 
these investments from operating profits.
IPIA also entered into discussions with the Ministry of Industry, 
which managed the national industrialization fund for Andalusia, to 
reduce the bureaucratic obstacles that had impeded Macael firms' 
access to this funding source. In early 1986, the Ministry agreed to pro 
vide the highest degree of financial support it could, namely, up to 25 
percent of those planned outlays for plant and equipment judged by 
IPIA to be consistent with the restructuring model. It was also agreed 
that IPIA would serve as a conduit for subsidy proposals.
IPIA also sought to make it easier for Macael firms to borrow funds 
from private sources. Commercial banks in Andalusia were historically 
wary of loaning funds to small enterprises. In the years immediately 
preceding the Action Plan, banks practically refused to extend credit to 
Macael firms, including Banco Popular, which had maintained a 
branch office in Macael for 30 years. As the result of negotiations that 
began in January 1986, this bank agreed to extend five-year loans 
instead of its usual short-term loans for industrialization projects. The 
regional government, in turn, agreed to provide an interest rate subsidy 
of 2 percent for projects that implemented the Action Plan. A similar 
agreement was reached later in the year with the quasi-public savings 
bank of Almerfa (Caja de Ahorros). 16
When meeting with banks and agencies, IPIA usually noted that 
Macael's proven marble reserves were plentiful and that the demand 
for the area's products would grow markedly. The ADARO studies and 
the sharp upturn in demand that occurred in 1985—as construction 
activity revived along Andalusia's Costa del Sol—gave credibility to 
these points. Citing investments in infrastructure, IPIA also sought to 
demonstrate the public sector's commitment to eliminating bottle 
necks. At such meetings, the president of the employers association 
argued that the area's business owners were committed to making 
Macael a major force in the national and European marble industry.
In mobilizing resources for Macael, the Institute anticipated that 
social and political arguments would be as persuasive to some audi 
ences as economic ones. Andalusia's weak industrialization was 
widely considered to be a pressing social problem. Many institutions, 
moreover, were extremely sensitive to the fact that the socialist party 
had won an absolute majority in the regional parliament after cam-
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paigning on a platform of social and economic development. 17 S&ichez 
de la Morena explained that IPIA's specific mission was to find ways of 
manufacturing valuable products from Andalusia's rich endowment of 
natural resources and to stitch together the region's economic fabric. 
He pointed out that Almerfa province was otherwise virtually bereft of 
industrial activity. By implication, financing investments at Macael 
represented an excellent way to advance the industrial development 
goals of the regional government and of the Andalusian public.
The Macael planning committee promoted this concept through a 
variety of means. For example, the employers association in 1985 
invented the Premio de Mdrmol, a prize to be awarded annually to an 
individual or institution who made a significant contribution to the 
local industry. The association's leadership chose the award recipients 
carefully. In 1987, for instance, a Premio de Mdrmol was given to the 
editor of a national news magazine, Cambio 16, who had previously 
worked for a prominent newspaper in Almerfa; to the director of a 
major provincial bank, Caja Almerfa; and to the trade association of 
eastern Andalusia's architects. In this way, special ties were fostered 
with national media, banking, and customer organizations. Members of 
the planning committee found additional ways to draw influential out 
siders to Macael. As just one example, the regional government's pres 
ident came to inaugurate the warehouses for the buyers and marketing 
cooperatives in March 1986. Apart from these special events, planning 
committee leaders created hundreds of opportunities to project 
Macael's image as an industry and community on the move. 18
The combined efforts of IPIA and the Macael Action Plan leaders 
succeeded in generating about 700 million pesetas ($US 5 million) in 
government grants and about 1,850 million pesetas ($US 15 million) in 
loans for investments in plant and equipment during 1986-88. The 
goals for aggregate investment in plant and equipment, set out in the 
industrial restructuring model, were practically reached before the end 
of 1988, thanks in large part to an extremely high rate of profit rein 
vestment. The total investment in Macael, including infrastructure, 
research, and institution-building, exceeded 5 billion pesetas ($US 42 
million) during the first five years of the Action Plan.
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Clinical Interpretations
Once the coordinator votes in favor of an action plan proposal 
requiring external financial resources, it is obligated to use its institu 
tional muscle with banks, government agencies, and utilities in order to 
implement the agreed upon plan. In many cases, banks and govern 
ment agencies are reluctant to invest in industries of the past When 
decisionmakers are naturally skeptical of investing resources in tradi 
tional industries, it is advantageous to expose them to the action plan 
process. One way to do so is for the coordinator to be joined by other 
key planning committee members at negotiating sessions; another is to 
invite decisionmakers to make site visits. The action plan's numerous 
diagnostic and prescriptive studies are another important tool for 
explaining how implementing the plan will enable the local industry to 
compete.
If agencies are seeking to make their programs visible in the public 
eye, it makes sense to intimate that a formal agreement will be publi 
cized and that credit for the overall success of the action plan will be 
shared. If funding agencies and banks are looking for ways to serve 
small and medium-sized firms efficiently, it is advantageous to explain 
how the framework of the action plan will reduce the transaction costs 
of evaluating individual project proposals. To underscore this advan 
tage, action plan coordinators might serve as a conduit between partic 
ular firms and these large institutions.
Outcomes
While total quarry output increased 33 percent between 1983 and 
1987, the production of marble suited for construction materials rose 
by 75 percent. 19 As a result of improvements in mining and fabrication, 
some 20 firms became major suppliers of building materials. By 1987, 
only 30 percent of sales were accounted for by unprocessed marble, 
while annual revenues reached 15 billion pesetas ($US 125 million).20
The industrial restructuring study recommended that firms that 
could not produce raw materials economically focus on the fabrication 
of decorative objects. The extent to which firms have followed this
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recommendation cannot be estimated with available data. It is, 
however, clear that some shops have purchased equipment to mecha 
nize this production process.
The number of firms that complied with the Action Plan and 
received subsidies from the regional government increased from 16 to 
64 between 1985, when the industrial restructuring study was com 
pleted, and 1987.21 Total investment in plant and equipment during 
1984-88 reached $US 30.6 million.22
The Sociedad de la Marca has been extremely active in promoting 
the brand name "Mdrmol de Macael" Between 1986 and 1987, it 
administered an advertising promotion budget of more than 70 million 
pesetas (about $US 600,000). Its activities, along with the objective 
improvements in product quality, have made the name "Macael" a 
potent signal of value in the national marble industry.
Macael firms have utilized their purchasing cooperative. It is diffi 
cult to estimate, however, the magnitude of the cost savings it gener 
ated. The sales and marketing cooperative has not been utilized by 
firms catering to the construction industry. Most firms have been sell 
ing directly all they can produce, thanks to a boom in luxury construc 
tion activity in Spain.
Conclusion
The use of the operational method of coordinating a negotiated, 
comprehensive, and dynamic Action Plan helped to achieve results in 
Macael that were congruent with the political platform of Andalusia's 
elected leaders and public policies, as well as with IPIA's mandate and 
organizational strategy during the 1982-87 period. These results were 
achieved despite such constraints as distrust of governmental eco 
nomic or regional planning, a weak enterprising tradition, and the 
regional government's minimal direct control over economic policy 
instruments. The Macael case shows that this combination of policies, 
mandates, organizational strategies, and operational methods can be 
remarkably effective in contexts such as Andalusia, where subnational 
governmental officials were committed to promoting economic devel 
opment in the aftermath of a transition to democracy.
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An action plan is an operational method whose effectiveness in pro 
moting the aims of public policy depends significantly on the skill with 
which it is managed. While some skilled performances may be based 
solely on personal and inarticulate knowledge,23 coordinating an action 
plan is not one of them. Practitioners' skill in using this method may be 
enhanced by expanding their clinical knowledge.2* This paper expands 
clinical knowledge about the use of this operational method by inter 
preting why specific actions in Macael helped achieve the public pol 
icy aim of developing locally based industries in Andalusia.25
To be skilled practitioners, coordinators of action plans also need a 
way to conceptualize or frame the role they play. Role frames "deter 
mine practitioners' strategies of attention and thereby set the directions 
in which they try to shape the problematic situations they confront."26 
Judging from the Macael case, an appropriate role frame for action 
plan coordinators may be grounded in conceptual networks such as 
service management, issue framing, leadership, social learning, negoti 
ation, and political management.27 The literature about these concep 
tual networks—which structure an emerging American conception of 
public management—is a useful source of precepts for developing the 
role frame of action plan coordinators, as indicated below.
1. Service Management. Treat the stakeholders in an industry as cus 
tomers. Imagine how customers are likely to experience initial contacts 
with agency personnel. Assure stakeholders that the agency wants to 
provide a service rather than to exercise administrative control. Indi 
cate that if stakeholders reach agreement on an action plan, the agency 
would champion it in contacts with government agencies, banks, and 
other resource providers.28
2. Issue Framing. Choose carefully the categories employed to define 
the situation. 29 Identify goals that are attractive to all stakeholders, 
given the dominant ideology of the period. 30 Indicate that the problem 
is multifaceted, involving production, marketing, finance, and working 
conditions.
3. Leadership. Develop a transactive relationship with the stakeholders 
conducive to mutual learning. 31 Explain that the action plan should be 
theirs, not the government's. Insist that the purpose of an action plan is 
to achieve change, not just to study problems. Provide a certain amount 
of structure for stakeholders' involvement in the planning activity.32
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Empower stakeholders to perform leadership functions.33 Modulate 
conflict among stakeholders so that they are stimulated to master the 
situation they are facing, while not overwhelmed by the task.34 Gener 
ate small wins and celebrate successes.35
4. Social Learning. Create an experiential and institutional basis for 
joint inquiry and action. Use formal inquiry and analysis to create 
movement in the group process.36 Ensure mat expert knowledge is col 
lected or developed in response to stakeholders' perception of a need 
for it.37 Give stakeholders an opportunity to accept, amend, or reject the 
results. Help stakeholders fashion an attractive and realistic vision of 
the future. Focus attention on how the local industry fits into the 
broader environment.38 Let specific objectives emerge in the course of 
ongoing inquiry and action. 39
5. Negotiation. Negotiate networks of linked agreements consistent 
with public policy and the agency's strategy.40 Provide incentives for 
firms to collaborate when it is beneficial for the local industry as a 
whole.41 Seek firms' compliance with the action plan by making it the 
basis for allocating subsidies and credit.
6. Political Management. Publicize the planning process and results. 
Use analysis as an instrument of persuasion.42 Highlight stakeholders' 
commitment to achieving their vision for the local industry. Remind 
audiences of the relationship between public policy and the operational 
method of action plans.43
The conceptual networks within which these precepts are embedded 
emerged in the mainstream literature about public administration as the 
result of decades of criticism of a vision of good government as cen 
tralized, hierarchical, and staffed by experts. They reflect many con 
temporary American beliefs about social problemsolving and 
governance in a decentralized liberal democracy. As elected officials 
and managers in Eastern Europe and Latin America look for role 
frames appropriate to both their positions in democratic institutions 
and the substantive problems of postauthoritarian situations, they may 
find the experientially grounded conceptual networks of public man 
agement attractive.
Managing Local Development 63
NOTES
•A version of this paper appeared under the same title in Policy Sciences 24 (1991): 271-290. 
It appears here with permission of the publisher, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Earlier versions 
were presented at an OECD Conference on Regional Policies in the Europe of the Nineties, at the 
1989 Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Manage 
ment, and at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Funding for the research 
was provided by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The assistance of Catherine 
Moukheibir is gratefully acknowledged. The author has benefited from comments by Mark 
Moore, Raymond Vernon, Scott Pearson, Jose" M. O'Kean, Charles E. Lindblom, Michael Reich, 
Larry Wortzel, Lee Friedman, Robert Putnam, Ronald Ferguson, Andrew Stone, Alasdair Roberts, 
William Ascher, and two anonymous referees.
1. Estatuto de Autonomia, Art 12, §3,10, Legislaci6n Sobre Comunidades Autonomas, Vol. 1 
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1982). The Autonomy Statute was granted by the national parliament in 1981 in 
accordance with Title VIII of the 1978 Spanish Constitution.
2. See Michael Barzelay, "Andalusian Socialism: Political Ideology and Economic Policy in 
an Autonomous Community in Spain," paper presented at the American Political Science Meet 
ings, Washington, DC, August 1986. Development-from-within, or endogenous development, is a 
programmatic concept arising from sustained critiques of European regional policies of the 1950s 
and 1960s as well as of industrial recruitment strategies in the Third World and U.S. contexts.
3. See Michael Barzelay, "Ricardo Sinchez de la Morena and the Institute for Industrial Pro 
motion of Andalusia," Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer 
sity, Number C16-90-974; and Javier Perez Royo and Antonio Porras Nadales (eds.), El 
Portamento de Andalucia: Andlisis de la Primera Legislatura (1982-1986) (Madrid: Tecnos, 
1987), pp. 240-264.
4. See Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy (New York: The Free Press, 1980), Competitive 
Advantage (New York: The Free Press, 1985), and The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New 
York: The Free Press, 1990).
5. Much of the literature on the mandates and strategies of regional agencies is very general. 
See, e.g., OECD. Agencies for Industrial Adaptation and Development (Paris: OECD, 1978), p. 
49: "There appears to be a fairly general tendency for agencies to develop counselling and techni 
cal assistance functions. This would seem to be a normal tendency for small-scale agencies, which 
do not want to immobilise too large a proportion of their resources in particular operations. They 
thus look, jointly with enterprise managements, for outside financial, technical, and industrial 
support...It appears that, in general, the agencies are looking for action across the whole front, 
with financial operations associated with technological and occasionally with regional aspects of 
adaptation." Some studies recommend that policymakers combine three "policy options," namely, 
mobilizing funding, providing information, and fostering an individual and collective enterprising 
spirit (termed social animation). See William J. Coffey and Mario Polese, "Local Development: 
Conceptual Bases and Policy Implications," Regional Studies, April 1985.
6. On creating and claiming value, see David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as 
Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (New York: The Free Press, 
1986), pp. 29-45; and Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 
pp. 4-10.
7. See Ricardo S&nchez de la Morena and Jose" Maria" Bueno, "El Institute de Promoci6n 
Industrial de Andalucia," Boletin Econdmico de Andalucia, No. 4,1984, pp. 88-94.
64 Managing Local Development
8. The expression Sanchez de la Morena recalls using to frame the choice was, "O jugatnos 
juntos o pinchamos la pelota," roughly translated as "either we play together or we puncture the 
ball." Interviewed in Sevilla, July 1988.
9. Albert O. Hirschman, "Introduction: Political Economics and Possibilism," in his Bias For 
Hope (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 26-37.
10. "Se gestiona la celebraci6n de la I Feria del Marmol," La Cronica de Almeria, August 4, 
1985.
11. Data supplied by the provincial office of the Institute de Fomento de Andalucia, the suc 
cessor organization to IPIA.
12. La Cronica deAlmeria, July 7,1985.
13. The thorny question of how to assess Macael firms for their use of the brand name was 
sidestepped by the municipality's offer to give the corporation one-tenth of the mining fees it col 
lected. "Firmado el compromise de constitucion de la sociedad 'Marmol de Macael'," La Cronica 
deAlmeria, November 23,1985.
14. "Los objetivos del plan estan cumplidos en un 90 por riento." La Cronica de Almeria, 
November 28,1984.
15. Pressures started becoming more intense in mid-1985, as indicated by such provincial 
newspaper headlines as, "The reindustrialization is still up in the air." La Cronica deAlmeria, July 
19,1985.
16. La VozdeAlmeria, May 8,1986.
17. Some audiences may also have been sensitive to the fact that the PSOE held an absolute 
majority in the national parliament, as well.
18. To provide just one illustration, a provincial newspaper on the same day published an 
interview with Macael's mayor, entitled, "The economic objectives have been accomplished," and 
another with the employers association president, entitled, "The industrial planning of Macael: 
White marble is competitive in Europe." La Cronica de Almeria, October 5,1986.
19. These data were collected by the local government of Macael and reported to the Institute 
de Fomento de Andalucia.
20. In 1983, total sales were 3 billion pesetas. Inflation during 1983-87 averaged about 5 per 
cent
21. Institute de Fomento de Andalucia, "Inversiones Derivadas del Plan de Actuacidn Global 
de la Zona del Marmol de Macael," March 1989.
22. Idem.
23. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 
49-53.
24. Stuart Hart decries the lack of development of clinical knowledge about how to manage 
interactive planning processes such as the operational method studied here. "The complexity of 
problems [like economic development] places the planner at the crossroads between analysis and 
politics, as a facilitator of a strategic social process. Planning in this mode requires a gentle blend 
of targeted, strategic analysis and structured interaction among stakeholders with different per 
spectives and varying kinds of knowledge and information....[But] while analysts and commenta 
tors on such matters have been long on description of such problems and the broad characteristics 
of the integrative approach [to planning], there has been little in the way of practical prescription 
or method development. Few writers have wrestled with the down-to-earth realities ofoperation- 
alizing the integrative approach" (emphasis added). See, "Steering the Path Between Ambiguity 
and Overload: Planning as a Strategic Social Process," in Interdisciplinary Planning: A Perspec 
tive for the Future, edited by Milan Dluhy and Kan Chen (New York: Center for Urban Policy 
Research, 1986), pp. 117-121.
Managing Local Development 65
25. Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: Haw Professionals Think in Action (New 
York: Basic Bodes, 1983), p. 315, refers to such case analysis as repertoire-building research.
26. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, p. 309.
27. See, Michael Barzelay and Linda Kaboolian, "Structural Metaphors and Public Manage 
ment Education," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Fall 1990, and literature cited 
therein.
28. On service management, see Michael Barzelay and Babak Armajani, "Breaking Through 
Bureaucracy," book manuscript, Chapter 1; Barzelay and Kaboolian, "Structural Metaphors and 
Public Management Education"; James Heskett, Managing in the Service Economy (Boston: Har 
vard Business School Press, 1986); and Karl Albrecht, At America's Service (Homewood, IL: 
Dow-Jones Irwin, 1988).
29. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little Brown, 
1984), pp. 117-121.
30. "Goals are carrots and problems are sticks; both are inducements to support measures peo 
ple might otherwise find painful, unwise, or irrelevant to their lives." See, Murray Edelman, Con 
structing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 22.
31. See, John Friedmann, Planning in the Public Domain (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), pp. 181-187.
32. See, J. Richard Hackman and Richard E. Walton, "Leading Groups in Organizations," in 
Designing Effective Work Groups, edited by Paul S. Goodman (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
1986); and Ronald A. Heifetz and Riley M. Sinder, "Political Leadership: Managing the Public's 
Problem Solving," in The Power of Public Ideas, edited by Robert Reich (Cambridge: Ballinger, 
1988).
33. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Change Masters (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).
34. Ronald A. Heifetz, et al., 'Teaching and Assessing Leadership Courses at the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Summer 1989, p. 
542.
35. Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., In Search of Excellence (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1982), pp. 67-74; and Robert Behn, "Management By Groping Along," Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, Fall 1988, p. 646.
36. K.K. Smith and David Berg, Paradoxes of Group Life: Understanding Conflict, Paralysis 
and Movement in Groups (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987).
37. Hart, "Planning as a Strategic Social Process," p. 117; Charles E. Lindblom and David K. 
Cohen, Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem-Solving (New Haven: Yale Uni 
versity Press, 1979), pp. 72-85; Mark H. Moore, "What Sort of Ideas Become Public Ideas?" in 
The Power of Public Ideas, edited by Robert B. Reich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
1990), p. 83.
38. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1985).
39. Friedmann, Planning in the Public Domain, p. 187.
40. Lax and Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator, pp. 261-268.
41. The need for both individual and joint action in the context of fragmented industries is 
apparent in the industrial districts literature. On the Italian case, see Sebastiano Brusco and 
Charles Sabel, "Artisan Production and Economic Growth," in The Dynamics of Labor Market 
Segmentation, edited by Frank Wilkinson (London: Academic Press, 1981).
42. Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 2d edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- 
Hall, 1980), pp. 28-31.
66 Managing Local Development
43. Philip Heymann, The Politics of Public Management (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1987), pp. 74-75, 90-92, notes that democratic mandates are a source of the legitimacy of mana 
gerial actions and a basis for negotiating with other organizations in the policy environment
